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Abstract. Attacks on organisations today explore many different layers,
including buildings infrastructure, IT infrastructure, and human factor
– the physical, virtual, and social layer. Identifying possible attacks, un-
derstanding their impact, and attributing their origin and contributing
factors is difficult. Recently, system models have been used for auto-
matically identifying possible attacks on the modelled organisation. The
generated attacks consider all three layers, making the contribution of
building infrastructure, computer infrastructure, and humans (insiders
and outsiders) explicit. However, this contribution is only visible in the
attack trees as part of the performed steps; it cannot be mapped back
to the model directly since the actions usually involve several elements
(attacker and targeted actor or asset). Especially for large attack trees,
understanding the relations between several model components quickly
results in a large quantity of interrelations, which are hard to grasp. In
this work we present several approaches for visualising attributes of at-
tacks such as likelihood of success, impact, and required time or skill
level. The resulting visualisations provide a link between attacks on an
organisations and the contribution of parts of an organisation to the
attack and its impact.
1 Introduction
Modern organisations are complex entities. Understanding the interactions be-
tween the organisation’s infrastructure, IT system, and human actors is difficult;
understanding possible attacks on the organisation even more so. Traditional risk
assessment methods describe processes that can be used to identify attacks, and
to explain the attacks’ potential impact on the organisation. However, the focus
of these techniques is often rather technical and ignores the internal structure
and functioning of the organisation.
To improve the scope of risk assessment and the level of scrutiny, security
researchers have suggested socio-technical security models, which include the
physical, virtual, and social layer of organisations. Socio-technical security mod-
els acknowledge the need of considering all these levels in assessing the risk faced
by an organisation since an increasing number of attacks today do involve attack
steps on all three levels. The recent attack on a German steel mill [1], for exam-
ple, started with a spear phishing campaign, installing malware that gave the
1
attackers access to the office network, and from there to the industrial control
system. Eventually, the attack is said to have caused physical damage to the
mill’s production system.
To communicate the attacks identified in an organisation, attack trees [2,
3] are often used; due to their relatively loose definition, attack trees can be
adapted to the requirements in many different settings. Attack trees provide
structure to the represented attacks by relating a node representing the goal of
an attack with different alternative or required sub-goals, which an attacker may
or must perform. This structure makes attack trees also an appropriate target
for automated identification of attacks [4–6].
The TRESPASS project [7] applies attack trees as an intermediate represen-
tation of attacks. Attacks are generated from a socio-technical system model [8,9]
and are the basis of computing the risk faced by an organisation if one or more of
the identified attacks are realised. Properties of interest of these attacks include
required resources, such as time or money, likelihood of success, or impact of the
attack. The analyses also identify the Pareto frontier of incomparable properties,
for example, the likelihood of success of an attack, and the required budget.
When communicating the result of risk assessment, two components are of
interest: the actual attacks and the contribution of components of the organisa-
tion under scrutiny to these attacks. While properties of attack trees or other
attack models can be visualised in enlightening ways [10], the same does not
hold for the connection between components of the organisation and the attack.
Another limiting factor is the sheer size of attack trees, which easily can contain
several thousands of nodes. Manual assessment of the individual attacks in huge
attack trees is often impossible.
The generated attacks make the contribution of building infrastructure, com-
puter infrastructure, and humans (insiders and outsiders) to the attack explicit.
However, this contribution is only visible in the attack trees as part of the per-
formed steps, for example, as leaf labels. Mapping this back to the system model
is in principle not complicated. However, the actions usually involve several el-
ements (attacker and targeted actor or asset) that may be located far apart in
the model. Especially for large attack trees, visualising these relations quickly
results in a large quantity of interrelations, which are hard to grasp.
In this work we present several approaches for visualising attributes of attacks
such as likelihood of success, impact, and required time or skill level. The result-
ing visualisations provide a link between graphical attack models and graphical
system models. After a discussion of visualising properties of attack trees, we
present our approach of using metrics to identify the importance or contribution
of parts of the attack tree, and mapping it to the system model. Our approach
currently only considers contribution of model elements – it not, for example,
include information on how assets and actors are used in an attack.
Our approach is independent of the attack model or socio-technical system
model used. The only requirement is that all model elements have unique iden-
tifiers that establish the link between their occurrences in the attack tree and
the model, respectively. While we present them in the setting of the TRESPASS
model, which is similar to ExASyM [11] and Portunes [12], the general approach
can be applied to any graphical system model and any attack model. For exam-
ple, the metrics used for visualising model components can also be output as a
text file for sorting and further analysis.
The rest of this article is structured as follows. The next section gives an
overview of graphical models for systems and attacks, followed by a description
of the visualisation of properties of attack trees in Section 3. Based on these
properties, we specify in Section 4 metrics for identifying the contribution of
components of organisations to the attacks, and show their application in visu-
alising the contribution to attacks. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper and
discusses future work.
2 System and Attack Models
Before discussing the contribution of components of organisations to attacks,
we briefly summarise the system and attack models we consider in our work.
As stated above, our approach is not limited to specific models for systems and
attacks. We only require system models to provide unique identifiers for model
elements, and attack models to use these identifiers in describing attack steps.
2.1 System Models
System models include representations of both the physical and the digital infras-
tructure of an organisation. Approaches such as ExASyM [11] and Portunes [12]
represent relevant elements as nodes in a graph. Nodes represent locations, ac-
tors, processes, and items, and can be annotated with policies. Actors, processes,
and data are located at locations, items and data can also be contained in another
item. In our abstraction of the model, these nodes represent the organisational
components that enable and contribute to attacks. All elements in the model
provide a unique identifier that can be used to refer to the element and to ob-
tain, for example, information on its concrete type, model, or other relevant
properties. This information is used in the attack generation, but it can also
provide input to the visualisation of system models, for example, whether two
elements should be connected by an edge (e.g., two locations) or one within the
other (e.g., two items).
While models such as ExASyM [11] and Portunes [12] also define actions
that can be performed by actors and processes, these are not required for our
approach. We only expect to be able to extract actors and arguments of actions
from leaf nodes in attack trees.
2.2 Attack Models
Similarly, attack models represent possible attacks on the modelled organisation.
For the approach in this paper, we only require that attack goals can be divided
into sub-goals that can be combined either conjunctively (must all be completed)
or disjunctively (only one sub-goal need to be completed). This is very similar
to attack trees [2, 3], and just as for these it would be interesting to allow more
complex combinations at a later point.
As mentioned before we require the attack model to support extraction of
actor and assets from the actions in an attack tree. In our current work, ac-
tions are contained in the attack-tree leafs. The leaf labels contain words from a
regular language that provides, for example, information about type of action,
performing actor, which asset is obtained, and where the asset is obtained from.
The arguments to the action or exactly the identifiers that connect the attack
tree with the system model. We do not need to impose other assumptions that
are often found, e.g., about the ordering of sub goals from left to right; this is
due to the flow-insensitive nature of our visualisation.
2.3 Running Example
We use the same running example in this paper as in [5], which is based on a
case study in the TRESPASS project [7] centred around an actor Alice, who
receives some kind of service, e.g., care-taking, provided by an actor Charlie.
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Fig. 1. Graphical representation of the example system. The white rectangles represent
locations or items, the gray rectangles represent processes and actors; actors contain
the items or data owned by the actor. The round nodes represent data. Solid lines
represent the physical connections between locations, and dotted lines represent the
present location of actors and processes. The dashed rectangles in the upper right part
of some nodes represent the policies assigned to these nodes.
Charlie’s employer has a company policy that forbids him to accept money from
Alice or to steal money. Figure 1 shows a graphical representation of the example
scenario, consisting of Alice’s home, a bank with an ATM, and a bank computer.
Alice owns a card and a concomitant pin code to obtain money from an ATM,
and a password to initiate transfers from her workstation via the bank computer.
Some of the nodes are labelled with policies in dashed boxes; for example the
money at the ATM requires a card with a pin code, as well as that very pin code
in order to obtain money (modelled as input).
Figure 1 shows a graphical representation of the model of our running ex-
ample. The locations, represented by small rectangles, are connected through
directed edges. Actors are represented as rectangles with a location, e.g., Alice
is at home and Charlie is in the city. Both actor nodes and location nodes can
contain data and items represented as circles. In our example, Alice has a card
that contains a pin code and Alice also has (knows) the pin code for her card.
Actor nodes can also represent processes running on the corresponding locations.
The processes at the workstation and the bank computer represent the required
functionality for transferring money; they initiate transfers from Alice’s home
(PWS ), and check credentials for transfers (PC ).
Note that all elements have either a unique name or a unique value, which
serve as their identifiers. If an element occurs more than once, for example,
the password (pwd , 313) or the Alice’s pin (pin, 42), these occurrences represent
copies of the same artefact.
3 Visualising Attacks
The analytic risk assessment based on socio-technical security models operates
on attack trees and judgments about quantitative properties of the actions per-
formed and the actors performing them. After briefly discussing how to evaluate
attack models, we present a simple approach for visualising several, potentially
incomparable properties of such models. The approaches discussed in this section
provide the input for the attribution of contribution of organisational compo-
nents to attacks in the next section: the colouring will be used for identifying
important parts of the organisation, and the analyses results provide input to
the assessment of the contributions.
3.1 Evaluating Attack Models
The attack models generated from system models form the basis of analytic risk
assessment. Properties of interest [13] of these attacks include required resources,
such as time or money, likelihood of success, or impact of the attack based on
annotations of the leaf nodes in attack trees. Analyses [14] also identify the
Pareto frontier of incomparable properties, for example, the likelihood of success
of an attack, and the required budget.
The mapping of actions to metrics can again be achieved by mapping the
action and its arguments to a specific value. These metrics can represent any
Fig. 2. Attack tree visualisation plot. Nodes with border represent conjunctive nodes,
nodes without border disjunctive nodes. The two red paths represent the two attacks
with the biggest likelihood of success. The left hand path, however, has a higher chance
of success, which is represented by a higher saturation of the colours. The illegible labels
for even so small an attack tree document the inapplicability of this concept to showing
risk for organisations; attack trees tend to grow so large that they become unhandy
and require different visualisation approaches.
quantitative knowledge about components, for example, likelihood, time, price,
impact, or probability distributions. The latter could describe behaviour of actors
or timing distributions. For the visualisation described in this article the mapping
of leaf nodes to metrics and the analyses performed are irrelevant; we assume an
attack tree and a mapping from its nodes to an analysis result. For the purpose
of this work we have implemented simplified versions of [13,14].
3.2 Attack Tree Visualisations
While not at the core of our work, we briefly discuss the mapping from attack
tree analysis results to visualisations, since these map directly to the visualisa-
tion of the contribution of components of organisations to the risk faced by the
organisation.
We have applied three visual styles to illustrate the influence of paths in the
attack tree on the overall result for the tree:
– The line width of edges implies the resource usage of a specific path, that
is, how resource demanding an attack path is. We assumed attackers always
choose the path with lowest cost, lowest time consumption, and lowest dif-
ficulty to apply attacking. Thus the line width is inversely proportional to
these three parameters – the lower the resource usage of a path, the more
likely the attacker to take it (modulo other factors that come next).
– The transparency reflects the likelihood of success of a path in an attack. This
attribute is directly defined in the weight measurement: the more transparent
a path is, the lower its likelihood of success.
– The last and foremost property is color, which represents the overall impact
of a path, normalised to percentage of the highest impact for the whole
attack. The impact value is determined by the required resources, likelihood
of success as well as the profit of the attack. In general the color scale chosen
is between two colours, where one color represents 0%, the other 100%, and
other values are combination of the two. In our example the color scale goes
from green to red, which means the impact is increasing from low to high.
Clearly, more advanced visualisations provide even deeper insights into the
scenarions represented by an attack tree. In the TRESPASS project we have
explored many such methods [10].
3.3 Pareto-Efficient Solutions
In case of multiple parameters most analytical methods optimise one parameter
at a time, e.g., minimise cost or maximise probability of an attack. Such methods
may lead to sub-optimal solutions when optimising conflicting parameters, e.g.,
minimising cost while maximising probability; in this scenario it may not be
possible to identify the attack that will result in the biggest gain for the attacker.
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Fig. 3. Pareto efficient solutions for the attack tree [14].
Pareto-efficient solutions [14] result in combinations of these conflicting pa-
rameters, and can be used to approximate the results for comparable values.
Figure 3 shows an example of a Pareto-efficient solutions for an attack tree that
results in probability of a successful attacks ranging from 0 to 0.97 and the cor-
responding cost ranging from 0 to 695. Assuming that the attacker has a fixed
budget or a rational attacker who will not launch an attack if the cost is higher
than the expected gain, we can identify the optimal Pareto-efficient solution
from this set.
We are currently experimenting with approaches for visualising this directly
on the attack tree to indicate how close a path in the attack tree is to the most
Pareto-efficient solution. The approach of scaling between two colours, which we
applied for unary predicates as discussed above, does not carry over to binary
predicates, where we, e.g., have worse attacks (for the attacker) with higher
probability. We are currently considering three colours, e.g., green – red – blue,
or stretching of lines, where the colours have the same meaning as discussed
above, but the path lengths are scaled depending on how close they are to
the Pareto-efficient solution. The scaling would make identification of the most
Pareto-efficient attack (and the ordering on attacks) straightforward, since the
longer paths are more efficient.
4 Contribution of Components of Organisations to
Attacks
Now we put the different elements described above together to visualise the
relation between attack trees and system models. Remember that we require
all elements in the model to have unique identifiers; we use this identifier to
associate model components and attack tree actions.
As for attack trees we need a measure for how much a model element con-
tributes to a given attack. We apply techniques similar to our earlier work on
insiderness [15].
4.1 Measuring Impact
Computing the actual impact of a model component on an attack is as difficult as
computing the impact of an attack; the results can be used for ordering attacks
or influence, but they should not be taken as absolute answers. With this in mind
we have applied several techniques for measuring the impact of components on
attacks.
As mentioned before we require the attack model to support extraction of
actor and assets from the actions in an attack tree, and actions are contained
in the attack-tree leafs. Leaf labels provide information about type of action,
performing actor, which asset is obtained, and where the asset is obtained from.
All this information is provided through the identifiers that connect the attack
tree with the system model.
4.2 Counting Occurrences
The simplest concept of measuring impact is that of counting occurrences of
identifiers. It computes for a given entity in how many places it contributes to
the whole attack tree or a path. The occurrence-based ranking ignores analysis
results such as impact or likelihood. It is either measured as absolute number or
as percentage of occurrences of identifiers in the path or tree being analysed. It
is computed per identifier id for a set of nodes in a subtree of the attack tree that
represents an attack, assuming that id ∈ S returns 1 if true, and 0 otherwise,
and that node n has successors c ∈ succ(n):
I(id ,n) :=

[x, x] x = (id ∈ actor(n)) + (id ∈ assets(n)), if n is a
leaf node
[l, u] l = min(I(id , c)), u = max (I(id , c)), if n is a
disjunctive node
[l, u] l = Σc{l′|[l′, ] = I(id , c)}, u = Σc{u′|[ , u′] =
I(id , c)}, if n is a conjunctive node
(1)
As a first crude measure, this impact provides a defender with a quick overview
of which components of the organisation actually occur in the attack tree.
The occurrence-based impact provides for every identifier a lower and an
upper bound of occurrences; for conjunctive nodes these will be the same, for
disjunctive nodes the lower bound is the minimum of the lower bounds, and
the upper bound is the maximum of the upper bounds of the child nodes. The
combination of lower and upper bounds provides a measure for how reliable the
numbers are. It also allows to identify, whether certain elements occur in all
attacks: if I(id , r) = [x, ] for some identifier id , the root of the attack tree, and
x > 0, then the element with id contains in every attack in the tree.
4.3 Weighted Sum
The impact factor based on occurrences in the generated attacks is a rather
crude approximation, since every occurrence of an identifiers is assigned the
same impact independent on the actual contribution to the attack. Given that
the analyses of attack trees described in Section 3.1 provide us with quantitative
information about attacks, we can improve over the occurrence-based ranking
by weighting occurrences of identifiers with the impact of the attack they occur
in. The factors we can choose from are limited by available analyses only, but
include, for example, the likelihood of success, required time, difficulty, and cost.
In contrast to the occurrence-based impact we now include one of the analysis
results, by weighting the count for an identifier with the weight of the path, and
potentially normalising it. As before, it is either measured as absolute number or
as percentage of occurrences of identifiers in a subtree of the tree being analysed.
For defining the impact, we assume for identifier id for a node n on a path
in the attack tree:
– the set-membership test id ∈ S returns 1 if id is in S, and 0 otherwise,
Fig. 4. Visualisation of the weighted impact of an attack tree on the physical infras-
tructure part of the example model from Figure 1. Charlie is identified as the major
culprit as he occurs in every single attack step. Alice is less involved, since Charlie in
some attacks might steal money from the ATM directly (or the ATM altogether). It
is also clear from the visualisation that the user tag on Alice’s card is not used in the
attack, and neither is, e.g., the bank computer C.
– succ(n) returns the successors of node n in the attack tree, and
– val(n, p) returns the result of the attack tree analysis for a node n in the
(sub-)tree p.
Using these functions, we compute the contribution of an asset or actor with
identifier id, at node n with subtree p rooted at n based on the following cases.
If n is a leaf node, we obtain the result of the attack tree analysis for n and p.
If n is a disjunctive node, we compute the minimal impact for successors of n.
If n is a conjunctive node, the computation depends on the analysis result val
we are using. If we measure difficulty, time, or cost, we value the impact to be
the sum of the impact of all successors. If we measure likelihood of success, we
assume the impact to be the minimal impact:
I(id ,n, p) :=

vl = val(n, p) · (id ∈ actor(n) + id ∈ assets(n))
if n is a leaf node
vd = minc∈succ(n)(I(id , c, p))
if n is a disjunctive node
vca = Σc∈succ(n)I(id , c, p)
if n is a conjunctive node and we
measure difficulty, time, or cost
vcm = minc∈succ(n)(I(id , c, p))
if n is a conjunctive node and we
measure likelihood of success
(2)
Figure 4 shows the visualisation based on the weighted impact. For example,
the impact of Alice and her card on the attacks is different from the impact of
Charlie; for occurrence-based visualisations we would have expected a similar
result since they do not occur in all attacks. The reason is another, though:
the difference in impact is due to the fact that Charlie might decide to steal
the ATM, which has lower cost and higher chance of success than, e.g., social
engineering Alice.
4.4 Visualising Paths
Depending on the kind of attack trees, they contain information about moves
of the attacker in the organisation or not. If the move information is contained
in the attack tree, then the methods above extend to visualising in the system
model, which locations of the modelled organisation are most important for the
attack. This information is especially interesting for deciding, e.g., about the
need for (better) surveillance.
4.5 Visualising Pareto-efficient Solutions
As mentioned in Section 3.3, visualising Pareto-efficient solutions requires special
approaches due to the fact that the best solution may be in the middle of the
spectrum of possible attacks. Therefore, it may be important to visualise not
only the best solution, but also identifying solutions that are worse or better, but
are not chosen due to the efficiency criterion. The three-colour option discussed
above is also applicable in the model setting; other approaches such as the scaling
of edges do not carry over since different attacks with differing quantitative
valuations must be visualised on the same model.
4.6 Visualising different components
There exist many different analyses on attack trees, and it may be interesting
to investigate and visualise several values combined on a system model. For
many interesting counting approaches, e.g., the ones discussed here, one can
combine different values into a vector, and apply for each value the targeted
counting operation. Since the values generally may not be comparable directly,
one then can either apply Pareto-based techniques, visualise the different values
simultaneously, or apply a summation function that combines the individual
values.
5 Conclusion
Modern organisations are complex socio-technical systems. Understanding the
interactions between the organisation’s infrastructure, IT system, and human
actors is difficult; understanding possible attacks on the organisation even more
so. While attack trees are a natural approach to communicate risks and possible
attacks, it is often hard to estimate, which parts of an organisation contribute
to these attacks. Even worse, attack trees tend to be so huge that they are hard
to understand. Visualising the attack trees directly eases the treatment, but still
leaves defenders with large trees; what is needed is an approach that relates the
model to attacks.
In this article we have presented a systematic approach for such a mapping of
the results of attack generation back to system models. The visualisation can be
based on arbitrary counting of occurrences of model elements in the generated
attacks. We have presented two such approaches based on simple occurrence and
weighted occurrence. More complex ones could, e.g., also take the role of actors
into account, such as attacker, victim, or social engineered.
In the TRESPASS project [7], visualisations such as our approach contribute
to the attack navigator [16, 17]. Beyond this, the techniques presented here are
widely applicable. Our approach is agnostic to the underlying system and attack
models. The only requirement is the ability to associate actions and the involved
artefacts in the attack model with elements in the system model, and to obtain
quantitative judgments about the attacks. While the techniques discussed in this
work especially target IT security attacks, the techniques are applicable to any
kind of attacks and risks.
We are currently working on further refinement of the visualisations, e.g., for
Pareto-efficient solutions, and on more advanced counting functions. As men-
tioned above, it would be interesting to take the role of an actor into account.
We are also investigating how to extend our approach to attack-defence trees [18],
which combine actions by attackers with mitigating actions by defenders.
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